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1. Introduction 
In the standard life-cycle model of consumption with perfect capital markets, the 
optimal consumption path is insensitive to transitory income shocks (Friedman 1957).  In 
practice, however, individuals have only limited opportunities in the formal capital 
market to borrow against expected future income and, as a result, a range of alternative 
mechanisms has arisen to insure consumption against income shocks.  Individuals may 
“self-insure” by holding extra savings (Leland 1968) or by having other household 
members increase their labor supply after a negative shock (Cullen and Gruber 2000).   
 Similarly, if markets are complete, consumption should not vary across 
individuals in response to idiosyncratic income shocks (Cochrane 1991, Mace 1991, 
Deaton 1992a).  In practice, however, private insurance companies do not offer insurance 
against income risk, likely because private information about income prospects would 
lead to severe adverse selection.  Given the trade-off between moral hazard and the value 
of insurance, the government only provides partial insurance against income risk, mainly 
through the tax and transfer system and programs like unemployment insurance.  
 Informal insurance provided by families, the local community, or social networks 
may overcome some of the adverse selection and moral hazard issues plaguing formal 
insurance, because these groups may be better able to monitor the behavior of those with 
income shocks and because selection into or out of such groups is costly.  For example, 
Putnam (2000) argues that community (and hence also religious) organizations play an 
important role in providing social capital and in fostering norms of mutual aid and 
reciprocity among individuals.  Iannaccone (1992) and Berman (2000) show that many of 
the costs of religious participation, such as adherence to religious strictures, can be 
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rationalized as mechanisms to prevent free-riding on benefits provided by the religious 
group; in other words, religious organizations have mechanisms to limit adverse 
selection.  Moreover, the monitoring of fellow members of the organization is likely to 
reduce moral hazard.  One would therefore expect religious organizations to be well 
positioned to provide consumption insurance against income shocks, which is one of the 
hypotheses we investigate in this paper.1  
 Religious organizations also may influence their members in non-material ways, 
in particular by influencing beliefs, attitudes, and values.  For example, Guiso, Sapienza, 
and Zingales (2003) suggest that religious belief is positively associated with attitudes 
conducive to economic growth.  Similarly, religious beliefs can dampen or exacerbate the 
impact of stressful shocks on well-being by altering the value that the individual attaches 
to such a shock.  For example, Clark and Lelkes (2005) show that, in cross-sectional 
European data, marital dissolution has a greater negative impact on the happiness of 
Catholics than the non-religious, but that members of all religious organizations 
experience a smaller impact of unemployment on happiness compared to non-members.  
In this paper, we use longitudinal U.S. data to examine whether members of religious 
organizations experience a smaller impact of income shocks on their subjective self-
reported happiness.  Such “happiness insurance” could both be driven by consumption 
insurance provided by the religious organization and by the members of religious 
organizations attaching less value to changes in material circumstances. 
 We use two data sources to examine whether religion provides insurance in 
response to income shocks: the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) to examine 
                                                 
1 This adds to the possible benefits of religious participation suggested by the literature, which include 
increased utility in the afterlife and the consumption of religious goods in the present (see, inter alia, Azzi 
and Ehrenberg 1975, Iannaccone 1990, and Biddle 1992). 
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consumption insurance and the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH) to 
examine happiness insurance.  In our baseline specification, we find that religious 
participation (measured in the CEX as making any contribution to a religious 
organization) reduces the impact of income changes on consumption by roughly 40 
percent.  This estimate is mainly driven by white households, which constitute the 
majority of the sample.  The consumption insurance effect is imprecisely estimated for 
blacks, and, as a result, we can neither reject that it is zero nor reject that it is as large for 
blacks as for the rest of the sample.  We find marginally significant evidence of happiness 
insurance in the full sample, but this estimate is mainly driven by the black subsample.  
Blacks experience significant happiness insurance by regularly attending religious 
services; attending weekly rather than once a year approximately fully offsets the effect 
of income shocks on happiness.  For whites, however, we find no statistically significant 
happiness insurance effect of religious attendance in the baseline specification, though 
the point estimate indicates that attending weekly rather than once a year offsets about 
one third of the effect of income shocks on happiness. 
The finding that religious organizations serve an insurance function has two 
implications for government-provided social insurance.  First, there will be less demand 
for social insurance in more religious areas and by more religious individuals, which is 
indeed what Stasavage and Scheve (2005, 2006) find using both individual-level data on 
preferences for social spending and country-level social insurance expenditure.  Second, 
it implies that social insurance may crowd out insurance provided by religious 
organizations.  Hungerman (2005) and Gruber and Hungerman (2005) show that 
government social insurance spending in fact crowds out religious charitable spending. 
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 The paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we present a brief review of the 
literature.  In Section 3, we discuss our two data sets.  In Section 4, we outline our 
specifications and discuss identification issues.  In Section 5, we present our results.  
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Previous Literature 
The first major study to examine the economics of religious participation is Azzi 
and Ehrenberg (1975).  They model participation in church activities based on the idea 
that the stream of benefits from participation extends to the afterlife (“the salvation 
motive”), while they also allow that people derive enjoyment from church activities (“the 
consumption motive”) and that religious membership can increase the probability of 
succeeding in business (“the social-pressure motive”).  Their model implies that 
participation in church activities will increase with age because individuals are investing 
in the afterlife. 
In an excellent overview of the growing literature on the economics of religion, 
Iannaccone (1998) discusses a range of studies of the economic consequences or 
correlates of religious participation, for example Freeman’s (1986) finding that blacks 
that attend church are less likely to smoke, drink, or engage in drug use.  Iannaccone also 
reviews models of religious participation, including those of “religious capital”, which 
can help to explain why religious participation increases later in life and why as wages 
increase religious participation will be reflected to a greater extent through contributions 
rather than though attendance.  Using the CEX and the General Social Survey, Gruber 
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(2004) provides evidence for this hypothesis, finding an implied elasticity of attendance 
with respect to religious giving of -0.9.   
More recent studies have focused on the consequences of religious participation.  
Gruber (2005) finds that increased religious participation leads to higher educational 
attainment and income, less dependence on social insurance programs and higher rates of 
marriage.  To establish causality, he instruments an individual’s own religious attendance 
by the local density of other ethnic groups sharing the same denomination.  Using micro 
data, MacCulloch and Pezzini (2004) find that religious participation reduces the taste for 
revolution, while based on macro data, Barro and McCleary (2003) argue that there is a 
causal link between religiosity and economic growth. 
There is also a large literature examining the correlation between religious 
participation and subjective measures of wellbeing and distress (Diener et al. 1999, 
Parmagent 2002, and Smith et al. 2003).2  While we know of no other study looking at 
the ability of religious participation to buffer against income shocks, a number of studies 
find that it can attenuate the effect of traumatic events on subjective wellbeing or 
depression (Ellison 1991 and Strawbridge et al. 1998).  Based on European data, Clark 
and Lelkes (2005) find that religiosity may dampen or exacerbate the happiness effect of 
a traumatic event depending on the denomination and the type of the event.  
Religious organizations may be one of many institutions that provide informal 
insurance.  Families can help insure their members against shocks, though evidence 
suggests that in the U.S. insurance provided by families is far from perfect (Cox 1987 and 
Altonji et al. 1997).  In developing countries, there is considerable evidence of 
                                                 
2 There is also a large literature on the correlation between religious belief and health outcomes.  See, for 
example, McCullough et al. (2000). 
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households partially sharing income risk (Deaton 1992b and Townsend 1994).  This has 
spawned a large literature on self-enforcing risk-sharing agreements and other informal 
insurance schemes such as group lending or mutual credit (for example, Foster and 
Rosenzweig 2001, Gertler and Gruber 2002, and Genicot and Ray 2003).  Religion has 
received relatively little attention in this context with the notable exception of Chen 
(2004), who shows that individuals particularly affected by the Asian financial crisis 
were more likely to increase their religious participation and interprets this as religious 
organizations providing “ex-post” insurance for individuals hit by negative shocks. 
 
3. Data 
The data for our empirical analysis come from two sources.  First, we use the 
CEX to examine whether participation in religious organizations (measured by financial 
contributions to these organizations) provides consumption insurance against changes in 
income.  Second, we use the NSFH to examine whether participation (measured by 
attendance at religious services) provides happiness insurance against changes in income.   
 
3.1 The Consumer Expenditure Survey 
We use data from the 1986 through 2000 panels of the Consumer Expenditure 
Survey (CEX).3  The CEX is a nationally representative survey of roughly 5,000 
households per year, is the basic source of data for the construction of the items and 
weights in the market basket of consumer purchases to be priced for the Consumer Price 
Index, and is widely regarded as the best source of U.S. consumption expenditure data.  It 
                                                 
3 Beginning in 2001, the CEX changed the way in which it collected information on contributions.  We 
only use data up to 2000 to help ensure that the data is comparable across years. 
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contains information on the characteristics of each household member including their 
relationships, income and demographics, as well as detailed household-level information 
on expenditures.  Each household is interviewed up to four times at three-month 
intervals.  Three months of expenditure data are collected retrospectively at each 
quarterly interview.  Income over the past 12 months is asked only in the first and fourth 
interviews.  In the fourth interview, data on five types of contributions—contributions to 
religious organizations, charitable organizations, political organizations, educational 
organizations, and miscellaneous contributions—over the past year are collected. 
We consider two measures of consumption based on the expenditure data reported 
in the CEX, non-durable consumption and total consumption.  Non-durable consumption 
consists of expenditure on food to be consumed in the home, food consumed outside of 
the home, alcohol, tobacco, clothing, personal care, and transportation.  Total 
consumption includes non-durables plus durables (furniture, appliances, and consumer 
goods), housing, and housing related expenses (home mortgage interest and home 
maintenance).  We prefer using expenditures on non-durables as our measure of 
consumption because expenditures on durables do not measure the consumption flow 
from them and, therefore, provide a rather noisy measure of true consumption.  
Consumption of goods provided in-kind is not measured in the Consumer Expenditure 
Survey.  We measure the change in consumption as the difference in log quarterly 
expenditure between the first and last interviews.  Our measure of income is log real 
household income (in 1998 dollars) and the change in household income is the difference 
in log income between the first and fourth interviews.   
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 We use contributions to religious organizations as our measure of religious 
participation.  About 40 percent of households make a contribution to a religious 
organization and these contributions represent about 1.2 percent of household income in 
the CEX.  These findings are consistent with other sources; according to Iannaccone 
(1998), total religious contributions represent roughly 1 percent of GNP.  
 
3.2 National Survey of Families and Households 
We use the first two waves of the NSFH, a nationally representative sample of 
individuals, age 19 or older, living in households, and able to speak English or Spanish 
(Sweet, Bumpass, and Call 1988 and Sweet and Bumpass 1996).  The first wave of 
interviews took place in 1987-88, and a second wave of interviews took place in 1992-94.  
Though the questionnaires are not identical in both waves, many questions were asked 
twice making it possible to treat the data as a panel of about 10,000 individuals.  
The main outcome variable we use is self-reported happiness, which is the answer 
to the question: “Next are some questions about how you see yourself and your life. First 
taking things all together, how would you say things are these days?”  Respondents 
answered on a seven-point scale where 1 is defined as “very unhappy” and 7 is defined as 
“very happy” but intermediate values are not explicitly defined.  Because this question is 
asked in both surveys, we are able to measure the change in individual-level happiness 
between 1987/88 and 1992/94.  The use of self-reported happiness measures has become 
increasingly popular in economics; see, for example, Frey and Stutzer 2002, 
Blanchflower and Oswald 2004, and Gruber and Mullainathan 2005.  One of the 
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conclusions of this literature is that self-reported happiness is a useful proxy for well-
being, and responds to economic variables as expected.   
We use attendance of religious services as a measure of participation in religious 
organizations.  In our baseline specification we use the percentile location of an 
individual in the distribution of attendance, but we also use a dummy for attending more 
than the median as a robustness check.  The distribution of religious service attendance is 
reported in Table 1. 
 
3.3 Baseline Sample 
 Of the 100,549 households interviewed in the 1986 through 2000 panels of the 
CEX, 44,270 households are present in both the first and fourth interviews and were not 
coded by the BLS as an incomplete income respondent.  In the NSFH 7,486 main 
respondents have non-missing happiness in both waves, out of a total of 10,005 
observations in the NSFH panel.  In both the CEX and the NSFH, we restrict the baseline 
sample to those where the head and spouse are under the age of 60 at the last interview in 
order to minimize the relatively predictable income shock from retirement.  This 
restriction yields a final CEX sample of 31,787 households of which 27,190 are white, 
3,322 are black, and 1,275 are of other races, while the final NSFH sample consists of 
5,716 respondents of which 4,697 are white or Hispanic, 924 are black, and 95 are from 
other race/ethnic groups.  
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4. Empirical Strategy 
4.1 Specifications 
Our empirical test of whether religious organizations help insure their members 
against income shocks consists of two parts.  First, using the CEX, we examine whether 
religious contributions insure a household’s consumption against changes in income, and 
second, using the NSFH, we examine whether religious attendance buffers an 
individual’s happiness against income shocks. 
To examine whether religious affiliation insures a household’s consumption or an 
individual’s happiness, we run regressions of the form: 
 
(1)  ∆Outcomei = ∆Incomei β1 + Religi β2 + ∆Incomei×Religi β3 + Xi β4 + δt + εi,  
 
where ∆Outcomei, is either the change in log consumption or the change in happiness, 
∆Incomei is the change in log income, Religi the measure of religiosity (contributions in 
the CEX, attendance in the NSFH) and Xi an extensive set of demographic controls in 
levels and first differences.  Finally, δt is a set of month × year-of-interview dummies and 
εi is an error term.4   
Unless indicated otherwise, all variables in levels are the average of the responses 
in both interviews and all variables in first difference are the response in the last 
interview minus the response in the first interview.5  In our baseline specification, we use 
                                                 
4 Because in the NSFH the time period between the first and second interview is not always the same, we 
include both a full set of month×year dummies for the first interview and a full set of month×year dummies 
for the second interview.  In the CEX, the time period between interviews is constant, so a single set of 
month×year dummies suffices. 
5 This specification ensures that the variables in levels and first differences are orthogonal by construction.  
We therefore do not have to worry that the estimate on the level variable is affected by noise in the first 
difference variable. 
 11
log household income rather than log per capita household income as our measure of 
income.  While changes in per capita income may be a more accurate measure of the 
severity of an income shock, per capita income can also change because of other life 
events such as marriage, childbirth or death.  The direct impact of these life events on 
happiness may depend on religious attendance, thus possibly contaminating our estimates 
of insurance.  We also top and bottom code the change in log income at +/– 100 log 
points around the race-specific mean income change in order to rule out that a few 
observations with exceptional income shocks drive our estimates. 
 Under complete consumption insurance, changes in own income should not affect 
changes in own consumption or own happiness once changes in economy-wide 
consumption (in this case, captured by δt) have been controlled for.  That is, a finding that 
β1 is zero can be interpreted as evidence in favor of complete insurance.  Generally, most 
studies in the consumption literature reject complete consumption insurance (see, for 
example, Cochrane 1991, Nelson 1994, and Attanasio and Davis 1996), though some do 
not (see, for example, Mace 1991).  In the happiness literature, most studies with large 
enough sample sizes find a significant positive effect of changes in own income on 
changes in happiness, though a substantial part of this effect appears to be only temporary 
(Diener and Biswas-Diener 2002, Di Tella et al. 2005, and Gardner and Oswald, 2005). 
If religious organizations provide insurance for their members, changes in income 
should have a smaller effect on the outcome variable for their members, yielding a 
negative coefficient on the interaction term.  Thus, an estimate of β3 < 0 is consistent with 
religious organizations providing insurance.   
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4.2 Econometric Issues 
A.  Measurement error in income 
A major concern is that income is measured with error.  Thus, changes in income 
will be noisy and will lead to potentially severe downward bias in β1, the effect of income 
on consumption or happiness.  Fortunately for our objective, to assess whether religious 
membership provides insurance, we do not need to assess the effect of income on 
expenditure.  Rather, we need to compare the effect of income on consumption or 
happiness for participants compared to non-participants.  Unless measurement error in 
income varies with religious participation, the measurement error should lead to the same 
bias in β1 and β3, and the ratio of β1 to β3 should be unaffected by measurement error.6 
 
B.  Measurement error in religious participation 
The CEX does not measure religious participation by attendance but rather by 
contributions to religious organizations.  By contrast, the NSFH measures attendance.  
An important issue is whether contributions effectively measure participation.  
Unfortunately, we are unable to assess this directly because the CEX reports 
contributions but not attendance while the NSFH reports attendance but not contributions.  
Iannaconne (1998), however, reports that the determinants of religious participation are 
similar regardless of whether one measures participation by attendance or by 
contributions.  The contribution to religious organizations is only measured in the last 
interview in the CEX.  We discuss whether the timing of the measurement of religious 
                                                 
6 In Dehejia, DeLeire, and Luttmer (2005) we examine whether income volatility varies by religious 
participation as a rough indicator of differential measurement error by religious participation.  We find no 
large differences in income volatility by religious participation. 
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contributions could mechanically explain our findings in Section 5.1, but we conclude 
that this is unlikely. 
 
C. Endogeneity of religious participation with respect to income shocks 
 A concern with using religious participation as an independent variable in our 
specifications is that it could be endogenous with respect to income shocks that have a 
smaller impact on consumption or happiness (e.g., if those with temporary negative 
shocks would be more likely to increase attendance than those with permanent negative 
shocks).  This has been suggested by the recent work of Chen (2004) in Indonesia. While 
we cannot test for such a differential effect directly (because we cannot distinguish 
permanent from temporary shocks), we examine whether income shocks in general affect 
attendance using data from the NSFH and find only a very small and statistically 
insignificant effect of income shocks on attendance; a negative income shock of 100 log 
points would increase attendance by 0.6 percentiles (results not presented; see Dehejia, 
DeLeire, and Luttmer 2005).  Thus, while our effect goes in the same direction as Chen’s 
(2004) finding for Indonesia, the magnitude of the effect is not economically meaningful 
in the U.S.  Given the small magnitude of this effect, we will use average attendance over 
the two waves in our subsequent specifications, because this reduces measurement error 
in the attendance variable.7 
 In the CEX, contributions are measured in the final period, and thus it is a concern 
if changes in income affect religious contributions.  It is unclear in which direction the 
bias will go.  On the one hand, if positive income shocks are more likely to be permanent 
income shocks than negative ones and if people are more likely to contribute after a 
                                                 
7 We use average attendance in both periods, but find similar results if we use first period attendance.   
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positive shock, then those who contribute disproportionately experienced permanent 
income shocks and therefore have a greater consumption response to the income shock.  
This would bias us away from finding consumption insurance effects.  On the other hand, 
if negative shocks were disproportionally permanent shocks and if those experiencing a 
loss are less likely to contribute, then the bias would go the other way.  
  
D.  Does religious involvement proxy for other characteristics that provide insurance? 
 While all our regressions include an extensive list of household and individual 
control variables, one may be concerned that religious participants have different 
observable characteristics and that these characteristics explain their lower sensitivity to 
income shocks.  We deal with this concern in three ways.  First, we create a matched 
sample in which each religious participant is matched to a non-participant using the 
nearest-neighbor method such that the predicted probability of being a participant is 
roughly equal for the participant and non-participant.8  Thus, the matching procedure 
creates a sample in which the distribution of observable characteristics, to the extent they 
correlate with religious participation, is similar for participants and non-participants.  
When we run our regression on this matched sample, we are less concerned about the 
insurance effect of religious participation being driven by differences in observable 
characteristics. 
                                                 
8 For purposes of the matching routine a religious participant is defined as a religious contributor in the 
CEX and as someone with religious attendance above the own-race median in the NSFH.  A non-
participant matched to multiple participants is only entered once in the regression but with a weight that is 
equal to the number of participants to which it was matched.  While the matched sample contains all 
participants, some non-participants may not be matched.  Thus, the matched sample contains fewer 
observations than the original sample. 
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 Second, we not only interact the income shock with actual religious participation, 
but we also include an interaction with predicted religious participation, where the 
predicted value is based on the observable characteristics included as controls in our 
regression.  A finding that the insurance effect is driven by actual religious participation 
rather than predicted religious participation is suggestive evidence that the insurance 
effect comes from religious participation rather then observable characteristics correlated 
with religious participation.  
 Third, we control for as many of the omitted variables for which religion could be 
a proxy as possible.  In particular, the concern is that religious attachment could pick up 
individuals who are more risk averse (hence likely to have other forms of insurance) or 
more patient (hence likely to have greater savings and the ability to self-insure).  Thus, 
we control for whether or not individuals buy other forms of insurance and, in some 
specifications, for homeownership and their level of wealth and financial assets. 
 We also conduct a number of additional checks that help alleviate our concern 
that potentially unobservable differences between participants and non-participants may 
be driving our results.9  First, we determine whether our estimates of the insurance effect 
change as we add blocks of control variables to our models.  Second, we determine how 
sensitive our estimates are to the addition of controls for wealth, homeownership and 
insurance interacted with changes in income.  These simple tests help to determine 
whether religious participation is merely a proxy for unobservable individual 
characteristics that drive the insurance effect.  
 
                                                 
9 These additional checks are simple versions of the procedures formalized in Altonji, Elder, and Taber 
(2005) that use the amount of selection on observable variables as an estimate of the amount of potential 
selection on unobservable variables.   
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5.  Results  
5.1 Does Religious Participation Provide Consumption Insurance? 
In this section, we report results from our analyses using the CEX to examine 
whether religious participation, as measured by making a contribution to a religious 
organization, insures consumption against changes in income. Table 2, panel A, reports 
our baseline specification.10  In the first column, we see that changes in log household 
income are positively associated with changes in log non-durable consumption: for a non-
contributor, a one-percent increase in income leads to a 0.115 percent increase in 
consumption, which implies incomplete consumption insurance.  Households who are 
religious contributors do not have consumption growth that is different than non-
contributors.  Does religious membership offset the association between changes in 
income and changes in non-durable consumption?  The coefficient on the interaction term 
between changes in log household income and membership in a religious organization is 
-0.046 and is significant at the ten percent level.  We calculate the “implied degree of 
insurance” as the fraction by which religious membership reduces the consumption 
response to income shocks: 0.046/0.115 = 39.7 percent, which is significant at the one 
percent level.11 
                                                 
10 The regression also includes the following controls: log real household income, a dummy for income 
being zero or missing, average age of head and spouse, age squared/100, household size, the change in 
household size between interviews, the presence of children in the household, the change in the presence of 
children between interviews, education (dummy variables for high school graduate, some college, college 
graduate, professional degree), marital status (dummy variables for widowed, divorced, separated, and 
never married), change in marital status, a dummy for owning a life insurance policy, and year by month 
dummies.  In results, not shown, in which we only include control variables measured in changes, our 
results change little: the implied insurance effect for whites becomes 0.401 (0.096).  
11 It may seem surprising at first that the interaction term (-0.046) only has a p-value of 0.08 but that the 
implied degree of insurance is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  The reason for this is that the 
coefficient on income changes and the coefficient on the interaction are positively correlated due to 
sampling variation and that, as a result, their ratio is more precisely estimated. 
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In the second column, for white households, we find a similar implied degree of 
insurance of 40 percent.  For black households, reported in the third column, we see an 
even larger implied degree of insurance, but one that is not statistically significant.  
However, given the relatively large standard error, we cannot reject a hypothesis that the 
insurance effect for black households is equal to that of white households. 
In panels B through G of Table 2, we report a number of specification checks and 
sensitivity analyses.12  In panel B of Table 2, we present results in which we also add 
predicted religious participation (from a probit of religious participation on log household 
income, the full set of demographic controls described above, and a full set of year by 
month dummy variables) and the interaction of predicted religious participation with the 
change in log household income.  The results show that the insurance effect does not 
appear to be driven solely by observable differences in demographics between 
contributors and non-contributors.13 
In panel C of Table 2, we report results using the matched sample.  The estimated 
degree of insurance of religious participation in the matched sample is very similar to our 
estimate using the original sample.  This confirms the conclusion from panel B that the 
                                                 
12 Further robustness checks are presented in Dehejia, DeLeire, and Luttmer (2005): we measure income 
and consumption in per capita terms; we remove the top and bottom coding of income changes; and we 
define religious membership as a dummy variable equal to 1 if a household contributes more than the race-
specific median contribution, conditional on the contribution being positive to religious organizations in a 
year.  The results of these robustness checks are very similar to our baseline results.  In other robustness 
checks, which are not shown, we allow for separate insurance effects for increases and decreases in 
income; we find that our insurance effects are driven by smaller consumption responses to declines in 
income: for whites, the implied degree of insurance for downward shocks is 1.179 (0.354) but for upward 
shocks it is 0.185 (0.341), a statistically significant difference at the five percent level.   
13 In an additional specification check, we fully interact the indicator for religious participation with all 
control variables.  The results change little when we do this: e.g. the implied degree of insurance for whites 
becomes 0.411 (0.098). 
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results are not driven by observable characteristics that are correlated with religious 
participation.14 
In panel D, we examine whether charitable contributions also have an insurance 
effect on households.  While it is conceivable that some types of charitable contributions 
could also provide households with the kind of social capital that could provide insurance 
in times of need, this does not seem plausible for most charitable contributions.  Thus, if 
we were to observe charitable contributions also yielding an insurance effect, we would 
be concerned that the estimated insurance effect is an artifact of contributions (religious 
or charitable) being measured only in the last interview or that making contributions is a 
proxy for an omitted variable that provides the insurance effect.  In panel D, however, 
when we add an indicator for the household having made a charitable contribution and an 
interaction between having made a charitable contribution and the change in log 
household income, we see that charitable contributions do not have a significant 
insurance effect on consumption, reducing concerns about the causal interpretation of the 
insurance effect of religious contributions. 
In panel E, we use the change in log total consumption expenditure as our 
dependent variable instead of using just the non-durable component.  The results show 
that we continue to find substantial insurance effects for the total sample and for white 
                                                 
14 In additional analyses (not reported), conducted to help alleviate the concern that unobservable 
differences might be responsible for our results we, first, determine whether our estimates of the insurance 
effect change as we add blocks of control variables to our models and second, we determine how sensitive 
our estimates are to the addition of controls for wealth, homeownership and insurance interacted with 
changes in income.  When adding blocks of controls, we start with only demographic controls, add controls 
for education, add the level of income as control, and finally add all remaining controls. We find that the 
implied degree of insurance changes very little: e.g. for whites it is 0.394 (0.093), 0.396 (0.092), 0.395 
(0.093), and 0.386 (0.097) respectively.  Also when we add additional interactions with income changes, 
the implied degree of insurance changes little: e.g. for whites it is 0.492 (0.206), 0.336 (0.106), 0.355 
(0.156), and 0.398 (0.233) respectively as we interact income changes with wealth, homeownership, 
insurance, and finally all three. 
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households when using total consumption.  In panel F, we drop the age restriction that we 
imposed on our sample in order to avoid retirement-related income shocks.  The 
estimated insurance effects without the age restriction are similar to our baseline results 
for the significant effects.   
In Table 3, we split the results by the education level of the household head (high 
school or less versus more than high school), by household wealth, and by income.15 
There are two motivations for this.  First, the willingness of religious organizations to 
insure their members may vary by education, wealth, or income (with organizations 
plausibly being more willing to insure low-skill, low-wealth, or low-income members).  
Second, access to alternative, formal sources of insurance could also vary by education, 
wealth, and income.  We find a significant insurance effect for the low-education, low-
wealth, and low-income white samples, generally somewhat larger in magnitude than the 
results for whites in our baseline specification.  For the high-education and high-wealth 
white subsamples, we find no significant insurance effect of religious participation 
though we do find a significant insurance effect (at the 10 percent level) for the high-
income white subsample.  Thus, consistent with our priors, religious organizations mostly 
provide consumption insurance to more needy households.  For black households, we 
find a marginally significant insurance effect for the low-education subsample.   
 
5.2 Does Religious Attendance Provide Happiness Insurance?  
 In Table 4, we report the results of our analyses using the NSFH to examine 
whether religious participation can buffer the happiness consequences of income shocks.  
                                                 
15 We report results only for white and black households.  Results for the full sample are very similar to 
those for the white sample. 
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The first column of panel A presents our baseline specification for the full sample.  As 
before, a negative coefficient on the interaction term can be interpreted as religious 
participation providing an insurance effect.  We estimate the implied degree of insurance 
as the degree to which going from the 25th percentile of the attendance distribution 
(roughly attending once a year) to the 75th percentile (attending weekly) reduces the 
impact of an income shock on happiness.16  The implied degree of insurance for the full 
sample is 65% and statistically significant at the 10% level.  Thus, roughly speaking, 
active religious participation buffers about two thirds of the reduction in happiness from a 
negative income shock.  
In columns (2) and (3), we restrict the samples to whites and to blacks and find 
that our results are driven primarily by blacks.  For whites, the estimate of the implied 
degree of insurance is about a third, but it is not statistically significant.  For blacks, 
however, the implied degree of insurance is significant at the 1 percent level and the point 
estimate suggests roughly full insurance.  It is intriguing that our consumption insurance 
effects primarily show up for whites while the happiness insurance effects are strongest 
for blacks.  We discuss and interpret this finding more extensively in Section 6. 
 Panels B and C of Table 4 explore whether the baseline results could be driven by 
differences in observable characteristics between active religious participants and less 
active ones.  In panel B, we interact income shocks both with actual and with predicted 
religious attendance.  We find that actual rather than predicted religious attendance drives 
                                                 
16 We measure the implied degree of insurance as the effect of a 50 percentile point increase in attendance 
for comparability with Table 2: if we had measured attendance as a dichotomous variable (like membership 
in Table 2), the average attendance among the high attendance group would by definition be 50 percentile 
points higher than the average attendance in the low attendance group.  Formally, the implied degree of 
insurance is calculated as -0.5 β3 / (β1 + 0.25 β3), where β1 is the coefficient on the change in income, β3 is 
the coefficient on the interaction term, and (β1 + 0.25 β3) is the happiness sensitivity to income shocks of 
someone at the 25th percentile of the attendance distribution.  In specification E, where attendance is 
measured by a dummy variable, the implied degree of insurance is given by -β3/β1. 
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our baseline results.  Thus actual religious attendance, rather than observable 
characteristics correlated with attendance, provides the insurance effect.17   In panel C, 
we match each individual with above-median religious attendance to an individual with 
below-median attendance that has the same predicted probability of attending above the 
median, where the prediction is based on same set of control variables as in our baseline 
specification.  We find that the insurance effects in our matched sample are very similar 
to those in our baseline sample, though the estimate is no longer marginally statistically 
significant for the full sample.18   
 Panels D to F provide robustness checks for the happiness insurance results that 
are analogous to those provided for the consumption insurance results in Table 2.  In 
particular, we test the sensitivity of our baseline results to: in panel D, running the 
regressions as an ordered probit rather than OLS; in panel E, measuring religious 
attendance with an indicator for attending more than the race-specific mean; and, in panel 
F, eliminating the age restriction.19  In all cases, the insurance effect of religious 
participation is statistically significant for blacks, with point estimates generally 
indicating close to full insurance.  For whites, the insurance effect is never statistically 
                                                 
17 In two additional specification checks, in which we fully interact the indicator for religious participation 
with all control variables and we only include control variables measured in changes.  Our results change 
little: the implied insurance effects for blacks become 1.18 (0.29) and 1.15 (0.30), respectively. 
18 In additional analyses (not reported), conducted to help alleviate the concern that unobservable 
differences might be responsible for our results, we first determine whether our estimates of the insurance 
effect change as we add blocks of controls variables to our models and, second, we determine how sensitive 
our estimates are to the addition of controls for wealth, homeownership and insurance interacted with 
changes in income.  When adding blocks of controls, we starting with only demographic controls, add 
controls for education, third add the level of income as control, and finally add all remaining controls, and 
find that the implied degree of insurance changes very little: e.g. for blacks it is 1.16 (0.31), 1.17 (0.31), 
1.16 (0.32), and 1.25 (0.38) respectively.  Also when we add additional interactions with income changes, 
the implied degree of insurance changes little: e.g. for blacks it is 1.25 (0.40), 1.22 (0.35), 1.13 (0.36), and 
1.20 (0.44) respectively as we interact income changes with wealth, homeownership, insurance and all 
three. 
19 We also test the sensitivity of our baseline results to measuring income in per capita terms, eliminating 
the top and bottom coding of income shocks, and measuring religious attendance as times per month rather 
than as percentiles.  The results, reported in Dehejia, DeLeire, and Luttmer (2005), are very similar. 
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significant, though the point estimates generally indicate a degree of insurance that is 
economically meaningful.20 
In Table 5, we examine the insurance effect of religious attendance for 
subsamples of the data. We split the sample by education, liquid financial assets, per 
capita income, and the intensity of religious belief.   In panel A among black individuals, 
we find a significant insurance effect for less educated individuals.  For more educated 
individuals, we find an insurance effect, but one that is not statistically significant. 
Among whites, the implied degree of insurance for the less educated is large but not 
statistically significant, whereas for the more educated there is an insignificant effect in 
the opposite direction.  In panels B and C, when we split the data by financial assets and 
by per capita income, which are presumably closely correlated with education and each 
other, we get very similar results.  Thus, these findings echo the earlier consumption 
insurance results: the insurance effects are strongest for less educated, lower wealth and 
lower income individuals, whether it concerns consumption insurance (Table 3) or 
happiness insurance (Table 5).  
Finally, in panel D, we split our results by intensity of religious beliefs as 
measured by the average response to two statements about the Bible.21  We find that 
those with the greatest intensity of beliefs experience the largest insurance effect; among 
blacks this effect is significant and large in magnitude, and among whites this effect 
                                                 
20 In other robustness checks, which are not shown, we allow for separate insurance effects for increases 
and decreases in income; we find that our insurance effect is somewhat stronger for negative income 
shocks, but the insurance effect is no longer statistically significant when we restrict shocks to only positive 
or only negative shocks.  Hence, we lack power to distinguish whether the insurance effect is driven by 
positive or negative shocks. 
21 Because this question is only relevant for Christians, we drop those reporting a non-Christian religious 
affiliation from the sample in panel D.  The statements are “The Bible is God's word and everything 
happened or will happen exactly as it says” and “The Bible is the answer to all important human problems” 
and the response to each statement was recorded on a 5-point scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly 
disagree.” 
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points in the direction of insurance though it is not significant.  Various mechanisms 
could give rise to this finding.  Religious organizations could treat all participants equally 
but those with more intense beliefs might receive more doctrinal solace from attending 
after experiencing a negative income shock.  Alternatively, those with more intense 
beliefs may be more attached to their religious organization (in ways not captured by 
frequency of attending religious service) and the religious organization may channel 
assistance to more attached members.  However, in unreported regressions, we found that 
the intensity of beliefs by itself does not provide happiness insurance against income 
shocks.  Thus, just believing is not sufficient; one needs to participate in a religious 
organization to receive happiness insurance.22 
It will not be possible for our results to distinguish between the spiritual, social 
and material channels though which religious participation may provide happiness 
insurance.  However, by examining the insurance effect of other social activities, we can 
at least determine whether religious organizations play a special role in this regard.  
These results are presented in Table 6.  In panel A, we interact a range of social activities 
with income shocks.  For blacks, we find that all social activities go in the direction of 
providing insurance for happiness against income shocks, but that only getting together 
socially and going to social events at a church, synagogue or mosque are marginally 
statistically significant.  For whites, all activities (other than going to a bar) go in the 
direction of insurance, but none are even close to statistical significance.  In panel B, we 
examine the effect of participating in organizations such as political and service groups, 
leisure groups, work-related activities, and religious organizations.  These activities 
                                                 
22 Another split we consider is by religious denomination (available for the NSFH but not the CEX) and 
examine whether religious participation insures against shocks other than income. We do not find any 
significant results; see Dehejia, DeLeire, and Luttmer (2005). 
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generally do not provide a statistically significant degree of insurance, except for whites 
active in service or political organizations and blacks participating in church-related 
events (other than religious service).  We conclude that participation in religious 
organizations stands out from other measures of social capital in its ability to provide 
happiness insurance against income shocks. 
 
5.3 Discussion  
We find it interesting that the mechanism behind the insurance effects of 
participation in religious organizations appears to differ by race.  However, given that our 
results are based on two different outcomes and two different measures of religious 
participation and because there are no statistically significant differences in the insurance 
effects between blacks and whites, our results are merely suggestive that the form of 
insurance provided by religious organizations differs by race.   
Of course, because we use the same measure of participation for blacks and 
whites within each data set, the difference in measures alone is unlikely to explain the 
differences in insurance effects by race.  By contrast, if either attendance or contributions 
differentially measures participation for blacks and whites, then this difference could 
explain the differences in insurance effects by race.  For example, this could arise if all 
white participants, but not all black participants, of religious organizations make 
contributions or if all black participants, but not all white participants of religious 
organizations attend religious services.  For this reason, our statistical confidence that the 
form of insurance provided by religious organizations differs by race is limited. 
 25
Nonetheless, this finding is consistent with evidence from the sociological 
literature.  Cnaan (2002) finds that percent white membership of a congregation is a 
significant and positive predictor of a congregation’s financial commitment to giving, 
even after controlling for the income and total budget of the congregation.  Chaves and 
Higgins (1992) find that the form in which members of religious organizations help each 
other differs by race.  Mutual help in black churches is more likely to be in-kind (and thus 
less likely to be measured by the CEX) while mutual help in white religious organizations 
is more likely to be in cash or as a loan (thus showing up in expenditures in the CEX).  
Nelson (1997) notes that the level of trust between different families belonging to the 
same church is often remarkably low in poor black communities, and that this lack of 
trust may also inhibit short-term loans between members of the church community.   
The relatively small and insignificant happiness insurance effect for whites 
suggests a stigma attached to receiving assistance, though we do not have direct evidence 
for this.  Furthermore, moral or doctrinal support for those experiencing difficulties tends 
to be greater in black churches than in white churches, leading to substantial happiness 
insurance.  Nelson (2004), for example, notes that many poor black church members 
place less emphasis on material sources of happiness; instead, they view those in the 
middle class as people “who had lost their religious fervor by becoming too concerned 
with material goods.”  For many African Americans, the church is the community 
(Carson 1990).  Church services tend to be community-oriented and relatively long (often 
over 2 hours), and there are many well-attended social and community related church 
events.  Thus, relative to whites, African Americans who do not belong to a church may 
have fewer alternative sources of (emotional) support when they fall on hard times.  
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While these explanations seem plausible, further research on the exact mechanisms by 
which religious organizations provide insurance remains desirable. 
One drawback of the data we use to identify the insurance effects of participation 
in religious organizations is that we cannot identify the mechanism by which this 
participation buffers against changes in income.  The amount of cash assistance provided 
by religious organizations would have to be large to explain these insurance effects.  
Alternatively, participating in religious organizations may provide individuals with 
sufficient contacts within their community to enable them to receive aid directly from 
other individuals when required.   
One likely mechanism by which religious organizations may provide 
consumption insurance is by allowing their members to reduce the amount of their 
contributions in years following a reduction in their income.  By doing so, members 
would be able to reduce other forms of consumption by less.  From our analysis using the 
NSFH, we observe no decline in attendance in response to a change in income.23  A 
decline in contributions in response to a change in income, therefore, would be a form of 
insurance since the religious organizations would be continuing to provide services while 
allowing the member to make fewer (or no) contributions.   
Unfortunately, we are unable to identify the extent of this possible insurance 
mechanism since we only observe annual religious contributions in the fourth interview 
in the CEX data.   
 
                                                 
23 These results are reported in Dehejia, DeLeire, and Luttmer (2005). 
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6.  Conclusion 
We find that religious participation partially insures consumption and happiness 
against income shocks.  This finding has important implications for the public provision 
of social insurance.  Social insurance is less valuable for those who are already partly 
insured through their religious organization, implying that the optimal level of social 
insurance is inversely related to the religious participation of the population. 24 
Conversely, social insurance can crowd out insurance provided by religious 
organizations.  Thus, even where church and state are officially separated, governments 
providing less social insurance will indirectly stimulate the demand for insurance from 
religious organizations and thus mostly likely strengthen the influence of religious 
organizations.
                                                 
24 Of course, insurance provided by religious organizations may crowd out other forms of private insurance, 
such as that provided by extended families. 
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Table 1: Distribution of Religious Attendance
Full Sample White Black 
Percentile 
in own 
distribution
Times / 
year
Times / 
year
Times / 
year
1% 0 0 0
5% 0 0 0
10% 0 0 1
25% 1 1 7
50% 13 12 27
75% 50 44 52
90% 78 76 104
95% 104 104 156
99% 189 182 234
Mean 29.3 27.1 40.7
Std. deviation 40.4 38.0 48.3
N 5716 4697 924
Note: Each attendance measure is the the average of the non-missing 
values of that variable for waves 1 and 2. 
Table 2: Religious Organization Membership and Consumption Effects of Income Shocks
Variable Coeff.   (S.E.) Coeff.   (S.E.) Coeff.   (S.E.)
a. Baseline specification
Change in ln HH income    0.115** (0.012)    0.113** (0.012)     0.108** (0.038)
Member of a religious organization 0.008 (0.012) 0.011 (0.013) -0.015 (0.026)
Interaction -0.046* (0.025) -0.045* (0.027) -0.068 (0.069)
Implied degree of insurance     0.397** (0.087)    0.399** (0.094)   0.636 (0.419)
Adjusted R2
b. Horserace between actual and predicted membership
Change in ln HH income    0.124** (0.026)   0.127** (0.029) 0.070 (0.070)
Member of a religious organization 0.008 (0.012) 0.011 (0.013) -0.013 (0.026)
Predicted membership
Interaction with actual membership -0.042 (0.029) -0.040 (0.032) -0.081 (0.076)
Interaction with predicted membership -0.031 (0.083) -0.046 (0.094) 0.125 (0.207)
Implied degree of insurance 0.342 (0.243) 0.315 (0.267) 1.152 (1.773)
Adjusted R2
c. Matched sample
Implied degree of insurance    0.422** (0.179)   0.488** (0.196)   0.280 (0.483)
Adjusted R2
d. Horserace between charitable contributions and church membership
Change in ln HH income    0.110** (0.015)   0.111** (0.017)    0.082** (0.036)
Member of a religious organization 0.004 (0.010) 0.007 (0.011) -0.028 (0.024)
Made charitable contribution 0.010 (0.008) 0.007 (0.008) 0.030 (0.035)
Interaction with religious membership   -0.046** (0.021)   -0.055** (0.024) 0.021 (0.054)
Interaction with charitable contribution -0.006 (0.023) -0.001 (0.028) -0.042 (0.084)
Implied degree of insurance (religious)     0.418** (0.159)    0.500** (0.137) -0.251 (0.521)
Implied degree of insurance (charity) 0.055 (0.126) 0.009 (0.152)  0.505 (0.501)
Adjusted R2
e. Change in log total consumption expenditure used as dependent variable
Implied degree of insurance    0.171** (0.053)   0.193** (0.060) 0.217 (0.137)
Adjusted R2
f. No age restriction on the sample
Implied degree of insurance    0.439** (0.073)   0.503** (0.088) -0.129 (0.477)
Adjusted R2
Note: Standard errors are calculated accounting for the complex survey design of the CEX and are reported between parenthesis.  Standard errror for 
the implied degree of insurance is calculated by the delta method.  Significance levels: *: 10 percent; ** 5 percent.  All regressions also include the 
controls for log real household income, a dummy for income being zero or missing, average age of head and spouse, age squared/100, household size
the change in household size between interviews, the presence of children in the household, the change in the presence of children between 
interviews, education (dummy variables for high school graduate, some college, college graduate, professional degree), marital status (dummy 
variables for widowed, divorced, separated, and never married), change in marital status, a dummy for owning a life insurance policy, and year by 
month dummies. The sample sizes for the total, white, and black samples are 31787, 27,190, and 3,322 respectively.
0.0217 0.0764
0.0141 0.0708
0.0197 0.0658
0.0196
Full Sample White Black 
0.07760.0217
(absorbed by demographic controls)
0.0215
0.0215
0.0654
0.0367 0.0927
0.0195
0.0195
0.0172
0.0371
Table 3: Consumption Effects by Respondent Characteristics
∆ ln HH 
income Membership Interaction
Implied 
degree of 
insurance
∆ ln HH 
income Membership Interaction
Implied 
degree of 
insurance
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Adj. R2 N Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Adj. R2 N
Respondent characteristic (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
a. By educational attainment
High school or less    0.123** 0.005 -0.065   0.524** 0.0330 11588    0.126** -0.022 -0.127*  1.007* 0.1068 1919
(0.018) (0.021) (0.043) (0.157) (0.042) (0.044) (0.067) (0.528)
Some college or more    0.095** 0.017 -0.027 0.283 0.0271 15602 0.049 0.003 0.037 -0.757 0.1453 1403
(0.023) (0.015) (0.038) (0.204) (0.082) (0.058) (0.132) (3.271)
b. By liquid financial assets
$2000 or less    0.114** 0.019 -0.047   0.412** 0.0347 13580    0.119** -0.034 -0.103 0.869 0.0946 2612
(0.016) (0.018) (0.039) (0.113) (0.033) (0.031) (0.077) (0.583)
More than $2000    0.094** -0.004 -0.032 0.335 0.0306 13610 0.020 0.056 0.058 -2.826 0.2915 710
(0.028) (0.017) (0.048) (0.216) (0.159) (0.093) (0.172) (9.290)
c. By per capita income
$15000 or less    0.090** 0.002 -0.062   0.687** 0.0291 13358    0.106** -0.011 -0.064 0.600 0.1002 2322
(0.017) (0.019) (0.032) (0.190) (0.037) (0.039) (0.086) (0.527)
More than $15000    0.147** 0.021 -0.030 0.206* 0.0319 13832 0.167 -0.069 -0.124 0.742 0.1757 1000
(0.023) (0.015) (0.043) (0.129) (0.134) (0.077) (0.173) (0.630)
Blacks
Note: Standard errors are calculated accounting for the complex survey design of the CEX and are reported between parenthesis.  Significance levels: *: 10 percent; ** 5 percent.  All regressions 
also include the controls from the baseline regression (table 2, panel a). Financial assets and per capita income are measured in 2005 constant dollars.  
Whites
Table 4: Religious Attendance and the Happiness Effects of Income Shocks
Variable Coeff.   (S.E.) Coeff.   (S.E.) Coeff.   (S.E.)
a. Baseline Specification
Change in ln HH income 0.267** (0.102) 0.181 (0.110) 0.780** (0.323)
Religious attendance (percentile) -0.131 (0.111) -0.073 (0.119) -0.506 (0.377)
Interaction -0.262 (0.183) -0.104 (0.202) -1.164** (0.516)
Implied degree of insurance 0.649* (0.352) 0.335 (0.569) 1.189** (0.333)
Adjusted R2
b. Horserace between actual and predicted attendance
Change in ln HH income 0.277** (0.115) 0.222* (0.121) 0.717* (0.401)
Actual religious attendance -0.095 (0.116) -0.024 (0.123) -0.687 (0.419)
Predicted religious attendance (absorbed by demographic controls)
Interaction with actual att. -0.283 (0.213) -0.189 (0.231) -1.049 (0.661)
Interaction with predicted att. 0.101 (0.454) 0.408 (0.510) -0.347 (1.306)
Implied degree of insurance 0.687* (0.387) 0.541 (0.533) 1.153** (0.371)
Adjusted R2
c. Matched Sample
Implied degree of insurance 0.607 (0.371) 0.422 (0.453) 1.148**
Adjusted R2
d. Ordered Probit
Implied degree of insurance 0.609* (0.341) 0.250 (0.548) 1.227** (0.341)
Adjusted R2
e. Attending more than the race-specific median
Implied degree of insurance 0.505 (0.385) 0.324 (0.553) 1.155** (0.554)
Adjusted R2
f. No age restriction on the sample
Implied degree of insurance 0.687** (0.307) 0.541 (0.459) 0.999** (0.308)
Adjusted R2
Note: Robust standard errors between parenthesis. Significance levels: *: 10 percent; ** 5 percent. All regressions also include 
controls for log real household income, employment by gender, employment change by gender, age, age squared, gender, 
household size, the change in household size between interviews, any children under 18 in the household, the change the 
presence of chidren in the household, education (dummy variables for high school graduate, some college, college graduate, 
professional degree), marital status (dummy variables for widowed, divorced, separated, and never married), change in marital 
status, race (black and other race-ethnicity), religious affiliation (12 dummies), private health insurance coverage in wave 2, and 
year by month dummies. Independent variables with missing values or logs of dollar amounts less than $100/year are dummied 
out. The sample sizes for the full, white and black sample are 5716, 4697 and 924 respectively. In the matched sample, the 
sample sizes are 4123, 3299 and 665 respectively.
0.0290 0.0365 0.0215
0.0345 0.0483 0.0668
0.0289 0.0365 0.0217
Full Sample White Black 
0.03640.0296 0.0137
0.0203
0.03070.0120 0.0147
0.0293 0.0347
Table 5: Happiness Effects by Respondent Characteristics
∆ ln HH 
income
Religious 
attendance
Inter-
action
Implied 
Insurance
∆ ln HH 
income
Religious 
attendance
Inter-
action
Implied 
Insurance
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Adj. R2 N Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Adj. R2 N
Respondent characteristic (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
a. By educational attainment
High school or less 0.257* -0.175 -0.376 1.154 0.0298 2353 1.079** -0.492 -1.640** 1.225** 0.0203 568
(0.154) (0.176) (0.296) (0.753) (0.410) (0.485) (0.651) (0.362)
Some college or more 0.085 0.042 0.176 -0.680 0.0413 2333 0.339 -0.211 -0.732 2.349 0.0078 355
(0.154) (0.164) (0.274) (1.459) (0.556) (0.593) (0.899) (3.234)
b. By liquid financial assets
$2000 or less 0.277 -0.145 -0.363 0.977 0.0345 1626 1.101** -0.234 -1.843** 1.439** 0.0136 584
(0.193) (0.238) (0.365) (0.801) (0.436) (0.570) (0.714) (0.397)
More than $2000 0.125 -0.047 0.062 -0.221 0.0342 3071 0.300 -0.793 0.068 -0.108 0.0205 340
(0.135) (0.137) (0.243) (0.965) (0.477) (0.502) (0.730) (1.239)
c. By per capita income
$15000 or less 0.452** -0.089 -0.364 0.505 0.0412 1588 0.698 -1.107* -1.347* 1.863* 0.0390 503
(0.189) (0.226) (0.344) (0.391) (0.469) (0.565) (0.706) (0.967)
More than $15000 0.018 -0.067 0.094 -1.141 0.0374 2989 0.519 0.172 -0.346 0.400 0.0374 354
(0.133) (0.139) (0.248) (4.822) (0.462) (0.556) (0.830) (0.783)
d. By intensity of beliefs
Below median 0.108 0.022 0.240 -0.713 0.0353 2389 0.533 -0.515 -0.774 1.140 0.0215 508
(0.144) (0.186) (0.333) (1.197) (0.390) (0.499) (0.696) (0.755)
Above median 0.289 -0.138 -0.319 0.759 0.0453 2029 1.545** 0.004 -2.270** 1.162** 0.0070 387
(0.205) (0.199) (0.318) (0.485) (0.696) (0.725) (0.988) (0.284)
Blacks
Note: Robust standard errors between parenthesis.  Significance levels: *: 10 percent; ** 5 percent.  All regressions also include the controls from the baseline regression (table 4, 
panel a). Financial assets and per capita income are measured in 2005 constant dollars.  The median of belief intensity is determined relative to the own sample.
Whites
Table 6: Other mechanisms of happiness insurance
∆ ln HH 
income Activity
Inter-
action
Implied 
Insurance
∆ ln HH 
income Activity
Inter-
action
Implied 
Insurance
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Adj. R2 N Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Adj. R2 N
Mechanism (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
a. Social Activities
0.210 -0.014 -0.041 0.485 0.0365 4697 0.516* -0.335** -0.234 1.662* 0.0257 924
(0.167) (0.052) (0.090) (0.885) (0.289) (0.109) (0.152) (0.877)
Group recreational activity 0.147* -0.005 -0.014 0.206 0.0356 4697 0.204 -0.032 -0.067 0.989 0.0146 924
(0.079) (0.027) (0.048) (0.707) (0.189) (0.080) (0.117) (1.805)
Going to a bar 0.089 0.038 0.045 -0.671 0.0363 4697 0.227 -0.037 -0.124 2.423 0.0122 924
(0.074) (0.031) (0.051) (0.797) (0.175) (0.095) (0.126) (3.987)
0.182** -0.023 -0.051 0.783 0.0366 4697 0.487** 0.141 -0.226* 1.734* 0.0191 924
(0.075) (0.039) (0.052) (0.870) (0.238) (0.101) (0.118) (0.926)
b. Activity in organizations
Service or political organization 0.202** 0.001 -0.280** 1.384** 0.0371 4697 0.137 0.162 -0.036 0.261 0.0226 924
(0.065) (0.073) (0.138) (0.592) (0.158) (0.201) (0.331) (2.249)
Work-related organization 0.120* 0.026 0.044 -0.370 0.0364 4697 0.121 0.529** 0.032 -0.266 0.0283 924
(0.068) (0.072) (0.125) (0.592) (0.168) (0.202) (0.317) (2.882)
Leisure groups 0.148* -0.137** -0.031 0.206 0.0368 4697 0.090 0.187 0.113 -1.263 0.0147 924
(0.085) (0.069) (0.120) (0.721) (0.210) (0.200) (0.324) (6.218)
Religious organizations 0.191** -0.117 -0.150 0.785 0.0377 4697 0.330 0.198 -0.346 1.048** 0.0145 924
(0.074) (0.085) (0.120) (0.485) (0.236) (0.207) (0.301) (0.492)
Whites Blacks
Getting together socially with 
friends / neighbors / relatives / 
Note: Robust standard errors between parenthesis. Significance levels: *: 10 percent; ** 5 percent. All regressions also include the controls from the baseline regression (table 4, panel a).  All the 
variables on social activities are measured on a 0-4 scale with 0 corresponding to "never", 1 to "several times a year", 2 to "about once a month", 3 to "about once a week" and 4 to "several times pe
week."  For these variables, the implied degree of insurance is the reduction in the happiness impact of income shocks associated with attendance going from 1 to 3.  "Getting together socially with 
friends / neighbors / relatives / colleagues" is measured as the average of four separate questions asked about getting together socially with each of these classes of people. "Activity in organization
equals 1 if the respondent reports to attend at least "several times per year" an event of such an organization. Service and policital organizations include service, fraternal, veterans' and political 
groups. The sample sizes for the white and black sample are 4697 and 924 respectively. 
Going to social event at church / 
synagogue / mosque
Appendix Table 1: Summary Statistics from the Consumer Expenditure Survey: 1986-2000
Variable Mean
Standard 
Deviation Mean
Standard 
Deviation Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Contributes to a religious organization 0.38 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.37 0.48
Ln HH nondurable consumption 8.02 0.72 8.07 0.70 7.68 0.74
Nondurable consumption (quarterly, in 
thousands of $1998) 3.98 3.48 4.13 3.55 2.88 2.62
∆ Ln nondurable consumption -0.015 0.717 -0.012 0.722 -0.035 0.679
Ln HH income 10.42 0.79 10.48 0.77 9.98 0.84
Missing ln income 0.0004 0.021 0.0005 0.022 0 0
HH income (in thousands of $1998) 43.41 30.84 45.16 31.17 29.39 23.17
∆ Ln HH income 0.038 0.602 0.037 0.589 0.032 0.683
∆ Ln HH income (bottom/top coded) 0.043 0.416 0.042 0.409 0.039 0.456
Missing ∆ Ln HH income 0.007 0.085 0.008 0.089 0.002 0.049
Separated 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.16 0.12 0.32
Divorced 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.34 0.17 0.38
Widowed 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.16 0.06 0.23
Never Married 0.17 0.37 0.15 0.36 0.29 0.45
∆ Separated -0.0004 0.078 -0.0004 0.077 -0.0013 0.089
∆ Divorced -0.0006 0.094 -0.0005 0.096 -0.0011 0.073
∆ Widowed -0.0002 0.046 -0.0003 0.044 0.0002 0.059
∆ Never Married -0.0038 0.086 -0.0038 0.085 -0.0042 0.094
Kids under 18 present in HH 0.45 0.49 0.44 0.49 0.55 0.49
∆ Kids under 18 present in HH -0.004 0.203 -0.003 0.200 -0.007 0.219
Household size 2.93 1.52 2.90 1.48 3.06 1.70
∆ Household size 0.026 0.568 0.026 0.551 0.029 0.669
Age 40.16 10.26 40.23 10.27 39.78 10.20
Age2/100 17.18 8.43 17.24 8.45 16.86 8.33
High school 0.25 0.33 0.25 0.34 0.23 0.30
Some college 0.20 0.30 0.21 0.30 0.17 0.28
College degree 0.12 0.25 0.13 0.25 0.07 0.19
Post college degree 0.09 0.22 0.09 0.23 0.04 0.15
White 0.86 0.35 1 0 0 0
Black 0.11 0.31 0 0 1 0
Other race 0.03 0.18 0 0 0 0
Ln wealth 6.19 3.98 6.52 3.88 3.60 3.79
Wealth zero or missing 0.23 0.42 0.20 0.40 0.47 0.50
∆ Ln wealth 0.001 0.96 0.009 0.96 -0.058 0.96
Owns home 0.68 0.47 0.71 0.45 0.43 0.50
Owns life insurance policy 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.50
N 31787 27190 3322
Full Sample White Black 
Appendix Table 2: Summary Statistics from the NSFH: 1987/88 and 1992/94
Variable Mean
Standard 
Deviation Mean
Standard 
Deviation Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Self-reported happiness 5.31 1.05 5.33 1.03 5.22 1.03
∆ Self-reported happiness -0.05 1.62 -0.05 1.61 -0.01 1.61
Percentile in religious attendance 0.48 0.25 0.46 0.26 0.57 0.23
Ln HH income 10.08 0.86 10.16 0.81 9.61 0.81
Missing ln income 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.18 0.08 0.18
HH income (in thousands of $1998) 55.21 52.69 58.68 55.27 36.59 31.97
∆ Ln HH income 0.18 0.87 0.18 0.86 0.14 0.86
∆ Ln HH income (bottom/top coded) 0.18 0.57 0.18 0.56 0.16 0.56
Missing ∆ ln income 0.25 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.35 0.42
Separated 0.05 0.16 0.03 0.14 0.10 0.14
Divorced 0.14 0.30 0.13 0.29 0.16 0.29
Widowed 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.12 0.05 0.12
Never Married 0.15 0.32 0.12 0.29 0.28 0.29
∆ Separated -0.01 0.26 -0.01 0.24 -0.02 0.24
∆ Divorced 0.01 0.33 0.01 0.34 0.03 0.34
∆ Widowed 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.12
∆ Never Married -0.07 0.29 -0.07 0.28 -0.07 0.28
Kids under 18 present in HH 0.57 0.43 0.57 0.43 0.58 0.43
∆ Kids under 18 present in HH -0.03 0.49 -0.02 0.49 -0.07 0.49
Household size 3.23 1.36 3.19 1.31 3.39 1.31
∆ Household size 0.08 1.52 0.06 1.47 0.12 1.47
Age 37.03 9.09 36.91 9.02 37.74 9.02
Age2/100 14.53 7.07 14.44 7.01 15.13 7.01
High school 0.38 0.48 0.38 0.48 0.38 0.48
Some college 0.26 0.44 0.26 0.44 0.27 0.44
College degree 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.32 0.07 0.32
Post college degree 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.33 0.04 0.33
White 0.82 0.38 1 0 0 0
Black 0.16 0.37 0 0 1 0
Other race 0.02 0.13 0 0 0 0
Female 0.60 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.65 0.49
Ln wealth 6.94 3.60 7.32 3.40 4.92 3.94
Wealth zero or missing 0.18 0.39 0.15 0.35 0.37 0.48
∆ Ln wealth 0.24 1.17 0.27 1.21 0.08 0.94
Owns home 0.57 0.43 0.61 0.42 0.40 0.44
Covered by private health insurance 0.78 0.40 0.79 0.39 0.68 0.45
No religion 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.03 0.24
Jewish 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.14
Baptist 0.19 0.39 0.12 0.33 0.53 0.33
Episcopalian 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.13
Lutheran 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.22
Full Sample White Black 
Methodist 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.25
Mormon 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.15
Presbyterian 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.17
Congregational 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.08
Protestant, no denomination 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.10
Other Christian 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.25
Other religions / missing 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.06
Frequency of (0-4 scale):
Getting together socially with friends / 
neighbors / relatives / colleagues 1.27 0.66 1.27 0.64 1.25 0.64
   Group recreational activity 0.89 1.00 0.81 0.96 1.33 0.96
   Going to a bar 0.77 0.94 0.80 0.95 0.62 0.95
   Going to social event at church 0.97 1.03 1.00 1.05 0.80 1.05
Participation in the following types of organizations:
   Service or policital organization 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.35
   Work-related organization 0.19 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.17 0.40
   Leisure groups 0.38 0.48 0.39 0.49 0.32 0.49
   Religious organizations 0.30 0.46 0.28 0.45 0.40 0.45
N 5716 4697 924
